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PRIORITIES IN COST SHARING FOR SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION: 
A REVEALED PREFERENCE STUDY 
 
  Government efforts to address agricultural nonpoint source pollution problems in 
the U.S. have relied primarily on two methods: (1) paid diversion of highly erodible land 
into conservation uses and (2) cost sharing the installation of conservation structures or 
establishment of management practices.  Both have persisted in various forms since the 
first conservation programs were established in the 1930s.  Both were originally 
established to address problems of lost farm productivity due to erosion, but have been 
adapted to encompass broader environmental quality concerns (Magleby et al.). 
Since 1985, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) has been the principal 
vehicle for paid land diversion.  As of 1999, the CRP contained 31.3 million acres, 
located mainly in the Plains and Mountain states and enrolled at an annual cost of about 
$1.6 billion.  It is administered at the national level through the Farm Service Agency, 
which evaluates farmers’ offers of land for rental contracts by comparing an index of 
environmental benefits constructed from information about the land offered with the 
rental payment proposed by the farmer. 
Until 1996, cost sharing was provided at the federal level under several programs 
with differing goals and criteria.  The largest was the Agricultural Conservation Program 
(ACP).  Other programs included the Water Quality Incentives Program, the Colorado 
River Basin Salinity Control Program, the Emergency Conservation Program, the 
Forestry Incentives Program, the Great Plains Conservation Program, the Rural Clean 
Water Program, the Small Watershed Program, the Soil and Water Conservation Loan 
Program, and the Stewardship Incentive Program.  In 1996, all federal cost sharing 
programs were consolidated into the Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP).    4
The scope of cost sharing programs has been much more modest than that of land 
diversion, as indicated by the 1999 annual EQIP budget of $200 million. 
In contrast to the CRP, cost share funding decisions are made largely at the local 
level.  Moreover, funding decisions (including both whether to accept a project proposal 
and the amount of cost sharing to offer) are made not by USDA personnel but by county 
employees accountable to a body elected from (and by) county farm owners and 
operators.  Delegation of spending authority to autonomous local bodies dates back to the 
introduction of cost sharing programs in the 1930s.  One possible rationale for it is 
overcoming problems of hidden information: A farmer’s neighbors presumably know a 
great deal more about what a proposed project might accomplish and about the size of 
payment needed to induce the farmer to undertake the project than federal employees 
living outside the area.  Thus, delegating funding decisions to local farmers (with 
oversight) could minimize or eliminate payment of information rent.  (Smith discusses 
hidden information in the context of the CRP.) 
A number of studies on the CRP have questioned how successfully paid land 
diversion has been adapted to address broad environmental policy concerns.  Simulations 
by Reichelderfer and Boggess suggest that early CRP signups were more consistent with 
a criterion of maximizing total acreage than the stated criteria of erosion control and 
supply management.  Ribaudo’s estimates of water quality benefits similarly suggest that 
the CRP could have effected greater environmental quality improvements by altering the 
regional distribution of enrollment.  Babcock et al. examine the distribution of 
enrollments under alternative environmental quality criteria.   5
Cost sharing has not been subjected to similar evaluation.  Yet one might expect 
there to be similar concerns about the appropriateness of project targeting.  Cost share 
funds have historically been distributed to counties on a block grant basis.  A local 
committee determines the distribution of funds in each county.  Eligibility of practices 
and award criteria vary from county to county.  A potential concern is that the priorities 
of the local committees that make funding decisions may not conform closely to 
environmental quality needs identified at the state or regional level.  These committees 
might place greater priority on local environmental quality, for example, small streams 
passing through farms rather than major water bodies.  Alternatively, they might give 
more priority to projects that augment farm productivity than to those that enhance 
environmental quality or favor projects proposed by farmers with greater local influence 
or political connections. 
This paper investigates these possibilities using a revealed preference approach to 
estimate the implicit decision criteria used to allocate federal cost-sharing funds in 
Maryland during the fiscal years 1994 through 1996.  A number of studies have 
employed this approach to study determinants of government agency decision making in 
cases such as highway construction (McFadden), pesticide regulation (Cropper et al.), 
water pollution standards (Magat et al.), and consumer product safety regulation 
(Thomas).  Maryland is an interesting state for such an investigation because cost sharing 
plays an important role in efforts to improve water quality in the Chesapeake Bay.  
Agriculture is an important source of nutrient loadings into the Bay, accounting for an 
estimated one-third of total nitrogen loadings and two-fifths of total phosphorus loadings 
into the Bay (Chesapeake Bay Program).  The Bay is a water body of major regional   6
significance, but water quality in the Bay is not necessarily affected by projects aimed at 
local streams or those aimed at preserving or enhancing farm productivity.  Thus, the 
potential exists for a mismatch between cost sharing priorities at the local and 
state/regional levels. 
 
Administration of Federal Cost Sharing Programs 
Federal cost sharing is administered through a complex set of arrangements involving 
farmers, county employees, and USDA agencies.  This set of arrangements dates back to 
the 1930s.  The roles of the entities involved are as follows. 
Funding is provided through USDA’s Farm Services Agency (FSA).  Funding is 
allocated to states and counties based on historical appropriations.  FSA also provides 
financial oversight, reviewing funding decisions ex post to ensure that the projects 
receiving funding meet statutory criteria and to monitor against malfeasance. 
Cost sharing is voluntary.  Farmers submit proposals that give project details and 
requested funding.  USDA’s Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) and local 
soil conservation districts provide technical assistance in preparing these proposals.  They 
also provide technical oversight: NRCS must certify that a proposed project is consistent 
with overall conservation goals and with the farmer’s individual conservation plan in 
order to make the project eligible for further review.  NRCS technicians also provide 
technical information about the project for review purposes. 
County committees (CCs) consisting of (and elected by) farm owners and 
operators resident in the county are ultimately responsible for deciding which proposals 
to accept and how much funding to offer for each accepted project.  CCs work with FSA,   7
NRCS, and soil conservation district personnel to conduct needs assessments and set 
overall priorities.  They also hire a county executive director (CED) to make day-to-day 
administrative decisions.  While paid from federal funds, the CED is employed by and 
accountable to the CC. 
The CED reviews project proposals, ranks them, and makes recommendations 
regarding funding levels.  The CC has authority to make final decisions about allocating 
the county’s cost sharing budget. 
Additional oversight is provided by state technical committees (STCs), whose 
members are appointed by the federal executive branch.  STCs, in conjunction with 
NCRS personnel, set state priorities and make program policy recommendations.  They 
also hear appeals on CC funding decisions.  FSA personnel in Washington oversee STC 
operations. 
Local farmer control over project funding decisions creates the potential for a 
mismatch between the priorities of cost sharing program expressed at the federal level 
and those actually guiding implementation of the program.  Several types of incongruity 
between federal and local priorities seem possible.  First, CCs may prefer to fund projects 
that enhance farm profitability regardless of environmental quality considerations that 
provide the nominal rationale for the program.  Second, CCs may give priority to projects 
proposed by politically influential farmers over those with greater environmental quality 
benefits.  Third, CCs may prefer to fund projects that enhance environmental quality at 
the local level rather than addressing broader regional and national environmental quality 
concerns.   8
The county level funding decision process can be represented formally as follows 
(see Babcock et al. for a similar characterization of CRP decision making).  Consider a 
single CC with an annual budget M that receives j = 1, …, N applications for cost 
sharing.  Proposed project j has a vector of characteristics Xj, verified by the NRCS 
technician.  If CC decisions are influenced by political considerations, the characteristics 
of the farmer proposed the project, Yj, will be relevant as well.  The benefits of overall 
cost share spending, as perceived by the CC, are a function of those characteristics, 
B(Xj,Yj).  The project proposal also contains estimates of the cost of the project to the 
farmer and the amount of cost sharing funds requested.  The CC must decide whether or 
not to fund the proposed project.
1  Let qj be an indicator variable having a value of one if 
the project is approved for funding and zero otherwise.  Let Sj be the amount of cost 
sharing requested.  The goal of the CC should be to maximize perceived benefits subject 
to a constraint on its budget. 
Formally, the CC is assumed to choose q = (q1, …, qN) to 
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In an optimum, the marginal value of cost share funds l* is chosen such that the net 
benefit of the marginal project m selected for funding is zero, 
0 * ) , ( = - m m m S Y X B l .            (1) 
All projects with net benefits greater than those of the marginal project receive full 
funding (qj = 1).  The marginal project will receive full or partial funding (qm £ 1), 
depending on the availability of funds.  All projects with net benefits less than those of 
the marginal project will not be funded at all (qj = 0).   9
  This decision process suggests that the parameters of the CC’s benefits function 
can be inferred from data on cost share requests, funding decisions, and project 
characteristics in the following manner.  To a first order approximation, the benefits 
function for project j can be written: 
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Project j will be selected for funding if its perceived net benefit is positive: 
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The probability that the CC selects project j for funding is thus 
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where hj = -[￿ngnYnj + ej]  and F(h) is the cumulative distribution of h.  In what follows, 
we assume that the hj are independently and identically distributed normally and estimate 
the parameters of the CC’s benefits function b0, …, bK and l* using maximum likelihood 
probit.  As is well known, the benefits function parameters are identified only up to a 
constant.  Their signs are identified, however, permitting testing hypothesis about 
whether CCs place a positive, negative, or no weight on each attribute. 
 
Data 
The data for this research come from the Conservation Reporting and Evaluation 
System (CRES), a data bank constructed from the information collected by the technician 
assigned to analyze applications for cost share funding (U.S. Department of Agriculture). 
Beginning in 1995, CRES also included information on all applications including those 
that did not receive funding. Files for the State of Maryland for 1995 and 1996 were   10 
obtained via a request under the Freedom of Information Act.  Duplicate data from 
applications that remained active over more than one year were removed from the data 
set. 
The CRES database contains 190 variables that fall into four broad categories: 
referral information, background information, practice specific information, and 
administrative tracking information.  Of these 190 variables, only those discussed below 
were relevant to potential CC decision criteria for projects in Maryland.  The remainder 
consisted of administrative details or pertained to types of projects not undertaken by 
Maryland farmers (e.g., rangeland management). 
Referral information contains identification for each farmer (name, ID, address, 
etc.) and a brief description of the conservation practice to be installed. 
Background information includes the primary purpose of the practice, the source 
of funds, the program code, the estimated total cost of the project, the cost-share 
requested, and the number of acres served by the practice. It also includes site 
characteristics such as land capability class, soil loss tolerance, land cover and use both 
before and after project installation, types of endangered species protected, and the 
hydrologic unit in which the project was located. 
Practice-specific information was provided by the NRCS technician helping 
prepare the project proposal.  It varies according to the primary purpose of the proposed 
project.  Examples of information recorded for projects whose primary purpose is water 
quality include the type of water quality problem addressed, water body treated, and the 
severity of water pollution in the affected water body.  Information recorded for projects 
whose primary purpose is erosion control include acreage served by erosion control   11 
measures and tons of soil saved from sheet, rill, wind and other types of erosion.  
Information recorded for projects whose primary purpose is forestry include the condition 
of forest cover before and (expected) after the project, potential tree productivity, the 
number of trees per acre, and the tree species involved in the project.  Other types of 
information were recorded for projects whose primary purpose was water storage, 
irrigation, or rangeland management.  Maryland had few projects with these primary 
purposes.  Some projects had multiple purposes.  The relevant information was reported 
according to the secondary purpose of the project as well.  Project attributes for which 
information was not recorded (because the project did not have the relevant primary or 
secondary purpose) were assigned a value of zero, making the variables equivalent to an 
interaction term between the project attribute and a dummy variable for the relevant 
primary or secondary purpose. 
Included in the administrative tracking information were the dates on which the 
project was either approved or denied funding.  These dates were used to construct a 
binary indicator taking on a value of one if the data included a date on which the project 
was approved for funding and zero if the data included a date on which the project was 
denied funding.  For projects awarded funding, the CRES data include information about 
the actual installation cost of the project, the cost-share actually offered, and the date the 
project was completed. 
During fiscal years 1994 through 1996, 4,902 proposals were submitted for cost 
sharing under seven different programs (Table 1).  Each county had separate budgets for 
each of these seven programs, suggesting that each CC faced seven different budget 
constraints.  The ACP was by far the largest source of cost-sharing assistance, accounting   12 
for 80% of the applications.  To be consistent with the decision model, we included in the 
analysis only applications for cost-share assistance under the ACP. The goals of the ACP 
are to encourage reductions in soil loss and agricultural contributions to water pollution 
from both runoff and direct discharge in ways that provide long-term and community-
wide benefits.  Eligible practices and criteria vary from county to county. 
Applications for cost sharing with ACP funds were made for twenty-four different 
types of conservation practices during this period. Almost one-third of the project 
proposals submitted had water quality as the primary purpose (Table 2).  Most of the 
remainder had water quality as a secondary purpose.  A large proportion of project 
applications were awarded funding (Table 3), possibly due to the stringency of prior 
screening by NRCS technicians. 
 
Model Specification and Estimation 
The goals of ACP cost sharing include protecting farm productivity and 
enhancing environmental quality.  The CRES data include project characteristics 
associated with both goals.  The following variables were used to measure project 
attributes relevant to the cost share funding decision (X1, …, XJ).  Table 4 summarizes 
our hypotheses regarding the interpretation of their coefficients.  Complete sets of 
observations on these variables were available for a total of 2,271 project applications.  
Table 5 gives descriptive statistics. 
   13 
Characteristics Recorded for All Projects 
Primary Purpose of Project 
We distinguished four types of primary purposes: erosion control, water quality, 
wood production, and other purposes.  Dummy variables were created for each one.  As 
noted above, water quality problems have been the principal environmental concern 
associated with agriculture in Maryland.  If CCs emphasize environmental quality, they 
should be more likely to award funds to projects addressing water quality problems. 
 
Farm Productivity 
Potential farm productivity effects were measured by two types of variables: 
current land use and land quality.  CRES records the type of land cover before the project 
and that expected after project installation.  A dummy variable was created to distinguish 
cropland (grain and non-grain crops) from non-cropland uses (pasture, rangeland, forest, 
and other land uses).  Land quality was reported using the NRCS land capability 
classification system.  We grouped the eight NRCS land capability classes into three 
categorical variables.  High quality land (classes I and II) is the most productive and can 
be used for most, if not all, purposes.  The productivity of medium quality land (classes 
III and IV) is limited in some uses.  The productivity of low quality land (classes V and 
higher) is sufficient for only a restricted number of uses.  If CCs emphasize protection of 
cropland, they should be more likely to award funding to projects on land of higher 
quality and/or land currently planted to crops. 
   14 
Project Cost 
The amount of cost sharing requested was reported for all projects.  Equation (4) 
indicates the coefficient of the amount of cost share requested Sj should equal the 
marginal value of funds due to the budget constraint, l*.  If CCs are constrained by their 
budgets from funding all projects generating positive net benefits, this coefficient should 
be negative.  If CCs are not constrained by their budgets, this coefficient should be zero.  
A positive coefficient could arise for a number of reasons.  It could be due to CCs 
allocating funds to projects generating negative net benefits in order to protect future 
budget allocations by spending all current funds.  Alternatively, a positive coefficient on 
cost could be attributable to a positive correlation between the cost share requested and 




Erodibility, and thus potential damage to farmland and the environment from 
erosion, was measured by the soil loss tolerance, defined as the maximum annual soil loss 
that could be incurred while maintaining a high level of crop productivity.  The soil loss 
tolerance of the land on which the project would be installed was reported in discrete 
values ranging from 1 to 5 tons of soil loss per acre per year.  The soil loss tolerance was 
used to create four dummy variables in order to permit nonlinearity in the perceived value 
of erodibility.  If CCs emphasize reductions in sedimentation and off-farm problems 
associated with erosion, they should be more likely to award funding to projects on land 
more vulnerable to erosion, that is, land with lower soil loss tolerances.  If they 
emphasize maintenance of farm productivity, they should be more likely to award   15 
funding to projects on land that is less vulnerable to erosion since this latter type is most 
commonly used for crop production. 
 
Information Recorded for Projects with Specific Primary or Secondary Purposes 
Information on the remaining project attributes was collected mainly for projects 
with certain primary or secondary purposes.  The coefficients of these variables in the 
model thus have a conditional interpretation: They represent the weight accorded to the 
project characteristic in the benefits function given that the project has the relevant 
primary or secondary purpose.  In other words, each variable is equivalent to the product 
of the characteristic and a dummy variable that equals one if a project has a specific 
primary or secondary purpose and zero otherwise. 
 
Characteristics of Projects with Water Quality as a Primary or Secondary Purpose 
The types of water quality problems addressed by the proposed project included 
sediment, agricultural/animal waste, nutrients from inorganic fertilizers, pesticides and 
toxic substances, and others.  We created a categorical variable for each of these five 
types of water quality problem.  As noted earlier, the principal water quality problems 
related to agriculture statewide involve nutrients from fertilizers and animal wastes, 
although herbicides in streams and well water have evoked some concern.  If CCs 
emphasize water quality problems, they should be more likely to grant funding to projects 
targeting fertilizers and animal wastes and, at least to some extent, pesticides. 
The data distinguished five types of water bodies affected by the proposed 
project: rivers, lakes, groundwater, wetlands, and estuaries.  We created a categorical   16 
variable for each type of water body affected.  The Chesapeake Bay, the principal water 
body of concern statewide, is the only estuary in the state.  If CCs emphasize Bay water 
quality, they should be more likely to fund projects targeting estuaries.  Emphasis on 
groundwater should indicate priority granted to local environmental concerns, since the 
water bearing formations used differ across (and sometimes within) counties.  Emphasis 
on rivers could indicate granting priority to either local or regional environmental 
concerns, since the category includes major rivers that are of regional importance either 
by themselves (e.g., the Potomac) or as Bay tributaries in addition to small streams of 
strictly local interest.  Emphasis on wetland could similarly indicate granting priority to 
either local or regional environmental concerns: Wetlands are local resources but a source 
of general concern in the region. 
CRES included categorical measures of the current status of water quality in the 
water body affected by the proposed project.  Water quality status was recorded in terms 
of the Environmental Protection Agency’s categorization as to whether designated uses 
of that water body were impaired, threatened, met or not determined.  We created a 
dummy variable for each of these water quality status categories.  In many cases the 
designated use of the water body had not been determined.  We hypothesize that the latter 
consist primarily of small streams, local groundwater, ponds, etc.  This interpretation 
suggests that a positive coefficient on this variable indicates that the CC gives special 
emphasis to local-level water quality problems. 
   17 
Characteristics of Projects with Soil Erosion as a Primary or Secondary Purpose 
Information collected for projects whose primary purpose was soil erosion 
included tons of soil saved, type of erosion, and acreage on which erosion would be 
reduced.  Each was recorded for every practice included in the project proposal.  The 
amount of soil saved from erosion and the acreage on which erosion was reduced were 
both aggregated across all of the practices included in the proposal to get overall project 
totals.  If CCs emphasize erosion control, they should be more likely to award funding to 
projects with greater reductions in erosion and those controlling erosion on larger 
acreage.  A positive coefficient on the acreage receiving erosion control could also arise 
from a positive correlation between project size and farm size if larger farmers propose 
larger projects and exert greater political influence. 
 
Characteristics of Projects with Forestry as a Primary or Secondary Purpose 
Information collected for projects whose primary purpose was wood production 
included an index of the potential of the project site for timber production.  A higher 
value of this index indicates greater potential timber productivity  If CCs emphasize 
productivity (and thus farm income), they should be more likely to grant funding to 
projects on sites with greater timber production potential. 
 
Testing for Differences in CC Preferences Across Counties 
Each CC receives a separate budget, suggesting that its decisions should be 
modeled separately.  Nevertheless, aggregation is desirable in order to increase the 
number of observations used to estimate the parameters of each benefits function.  We   18 
tested for differences in benefits function parameters across counties by including 
county-specific dummies in the model, both by themselves and interacted with every 
other variable.  A large number of the interaction terms were collinear, for several 
reasons.  In some cases, collinearity was due to the fact that in some counties the number 
of project attributes exceeded the number of projects with a given primary purpose.  In 
other cases, all of the projects in a county with a given primary purpose had many of the 
same attributes.  In still other cases, none of the projects in a county with a given primary 
purpose had certain attributes.  These collinear and zero-value variables were omitted 
from the model.  Wald tests were then used to ascertain whether all of the interaction 
terms were simultaneously equal to zero.  The hypothesis of no difference across CCs 
could not be rejected at the 5 percent significance level for every variable.
3  All of the 
interaction terms were thus dropped. 
 
Estimation Results 
Table 7 presents the estimated coefficients of the probit model.  The model fits 
the data reasonably well, as indicated by a McFadden R
2 of 0.20 and the fact that the 
hypothesis that all of the coefficients equal zero is rejected at any reasonable significance 
level. 
As noted earlier, local control over project funding decisions creates the potential 
for cost sharing funds to be allocated in ways that do not meet broader environmental 
quality goals at the state, regional, and federal levels.  Local committees may fund 
projects that enhance farm profitability may be funded regardless of environmental 
quality considerations.  They may fund projects proposed by politically influential   19 
farmers with lower environmental quality benefits than those proposed by others.  They 
may fund projects that enhance environmental quality at the local level rather than 
addressing broader regional and national environmental quality concerns.  Overall, the 
estimated coefficients of the probit model suggest that productivity considerations play a 
major role in cost share funding decisions.  They do not provide evidence, however, that 
these funding decisions ignore environmental quality criteria or give undue priority to 
larger, presumably more influential farmers. 
The signs and significance of several coefficients suggest that CCs strongly favor 
projects that enhance farm productivity.  Projects involving cropland were more likely to 
be awarded funding, as were projects affecting high or medium quality land.  Forestry 
projects with greater site productivity potential were also more likely to be awarded 
funding.  The fact that the coefficient of land with the highest soil loss tolerance (lowest 
vulnerability to erosion) was significantly different from zero and positive (while the 
remaining soil loss tolerance variables were not significantly different from zero) is also 
consistent with an emphasis on enhancing farm productivity: In Maryland, more erodible 
land is generally less productive and thus less likely to be cropped. 
The estimated parameters suggest that CCs continue to give priority to erosion 
control, the classical mission of cost sharing.  Projects whose primary purpose was soil 
erosion were significantly more likely to be awarded funding.  The coefficient of total 
soil savings was positive and significantly different from zero as well, indicating that CCs 
accord greater priority to projects expected to achieve greater levels of erosion control.   
The picture with respect to water quality is mixed.  The dummy for water quality 
as a primary purpose was omitted from the model.  Thus, priority for projects with water   20 
quality as a primary purpose would be indicated by negative coefficients on the dummies 
for the remaining primary purposes.  But the dummies for the primary purposes of (a) soil 
erosion and (b) other purposes had coefficients that were positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 5 percent level, indicating that projects whose primary purpose 
was water quality were less likely to be awarded funding than those targeting primarily 
erosion control or other purposes. 
However, projects aimed at reducing nutrient runoff from inorganic fertilizers and 
animal waste were each significantly more likely to receive funding, as were projects 
aimed at pesticides and toxics.  (The dummy for other types of water quality problems 
was omitted from the model.)  Projects aimed at sedimentation, by contrast, were not 
significantly more likely to be awarded funding.  Thus, CCs appear to have given priority 
to nutrient and pesticide runoff reduction projects, that is, to projects aimed at the 
principal types of water quality problems emanating from agriculture in Maryland. 
With respect to the type of water body affected, the coefficients of rivers, lakes, 
and groundwater were not significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.  Since 
the variable for estuaries was omitted from the model, these results indicate that CCs do 
not give greater priority to projects aimed at the Chesapeake Bay than to projects aimed 
at these other water bodies.  Projects involving wetlands are generally undertaken to 
improve wildfowl habitat and thus income from renting farmland for goose and duck 
hunting.  Thus, the positive coefficient of the wetlands variable likely indicates priority 
given to projects that enhance farm income. 
With respect to water quality status, projects affecting water bodies whose 
designated use was impaired, threatened, or not determined were significantly more   21 
likely to receive funding than those affecting water bodies whose designated use had 
been met (which was omitted from the model).  The positive signs of the coefficients of 
the variables indicating impaired or threatened designated use imply that CCs target 
recognize water quality problems.  As noted earlier, according priority to water bodies 
whose use has not been determined can be interpreted as a concern with water quality at 
the local level. 
Overall, the results suggest that CCs are selective about projects claiming water 
quality benefits.  They appear to give priority to projects aimed at water quality problems 
attributable to agriculture (that is, those involving fertilizers, animal wastes, and 
pesticides) and to projects affecting water bodies where water quality is a greater concern 
(those where the designated is impaired or threatened).  They do not appear to give 
priority to projects aimed at the Chesapeake Bay, the principal water body of concern at 
the state and regional levels, although projects aimed at other water bodies may affect the 
Bay indirectly. 
CCs in Maryland also appear to be selective in funding projects whose primary 
purpose was forestry.  The coefficient of forestry as a primary purpose was not 
significantly different from zero.  The coefficient of timber site index was positive and 
significantly different from zero, however, indicating that the projects on more 
productive timber sites are more likely to receive cost share funding. 
The coefficients of the cost share requested is positive and significantly different 
from zero, indicating that CCs face binding budget constraints in choosing among 
projects with positive net benefits.   22 
Taken together, the negative coefficient of the cost share requested variable and 
the fact that the coefficient of total acreage receiving erosion control was not significantly 
different from zero suggest that political considerations have not played a systematic role 
in CC cost sharing allocation decisions in Maryland.  As noted earlier, it is commonly 
believed that larger farmers wield greater political influence.  They are also more likely 
to propose larger-scale, more costly projects.  The results obtained here do not indicate a 




Cost sharing of soil and water conservation practices and paid diversion of agricultural 
land have been the two principal policy instruments used to address problems associated 
with nutrient runoff and sedimentation from agricultural sources.  Both have been 
adapted from programs originally introduced in the 1930s to protect farm productivity. 
The work of Reichelderfer and Boggess and of Ribaudo raised questions about the 
success with which paid land diversion (in the form of the CRP) has been adapted to 
accommodate broader environmental concerns.  The results of our investigation suggest 
cost sharing in Maryland has been directed toward recognized environmental quality 
problems that can be addressed by projects that enhance farm productivity and 
profitability.  Projects that promise to increase farm productivity and income are more 
likely to be allocated cost share funding, as are projects that affect water bodies whose 
designated use is impaired or threatened.  Projects involving animal wastes, inorganic 
nutrients, and pesticides—the major agricultural sources of water quality problems in   23 
Maryland—are more likely to be funded.  In sum, in contrast to findings regarding the 
CRP, our results do not indicate that cost share awards in Maryland have been 
inconsistent with stated environmental quality priorities. 
Our data did not include measures of changes in environmental quality or direct 
measures of the political influence of individual farmers.  We were thus unable to 
examine the extent to which cost sharing was effective in improving environmental 
quality in Maryland or the efficiency of cost share funding allocations in meeting 
environmental quality goals.  Some of our results appear to be inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that more influential farmers are more likely to be awarded cost share funding.  
However, this interpretation depends on assumed positive correlations between political 
influence, project size, and project costs, assumptions that could not be examined 
formally using our data.  Thus, further research based on different data is needed to 
address these issues.   24 
Footnotes 
1 It might be argued that CCs have the power to choose the amount of cost sharing to 
award as well as whether to fund a project.  Farmers proposing projects they expect to 
generate positive net returns should be willing to accept less than the full cost share 
funding to which they are legally entitled and CC members’ intimate knowledge of local 
conditions and their fellow farmers may enable them to estimate the minimum cost share 
needed to induce participation.  In fact, one rationale for making cost share funding 
decisions at the local level is that farmers have better information about the true costs and 
benefits of conservation projects, so that delegating spending authority to the local level 
reduces or eliminates hidden information about the likely costs of proposed projects and 
thus reduces or eliminates the payment of information rents.  At the same time, social and 
political considerations likely militate against attempts by CC members to induce their 
neighbors to accept payments that are less than those to which they are legally entitled, 
since such attempts could create tensions within the farm community as well as reducing 
CC members’ reelection prospects.  As a practical matter, Maryland CCs do not appear to 
have chosen to adjust cost share payments much, if at all, during this period.  For 
example, we regressed the cost share offered on the cost share requested for the 
subsample of the data for which cost share awards had been made.  The coefficient of the 
cost share requested was 0.93 with a standard error of 0.009, the constant term was not 
significantly different from zero, and the regression R
2 was 0.89, suggesting that CC cost 
share offers almost exactly equaled the cost share requested. 
   25 
2 In principle, a negative coefficient could arise from a negative correlation between the 
amount of cost sharing requested and the political influence of farmers’ proposing 
projects.  However, larger farmers tend to have greater influence and are more likely to 
propose larger projects as well, making a positive correlation between political influence 
and cost sharing requested more likely than a negative one. 
 
3 The Wald statistics for the tests of whether the county-dummy interaction terms were 
simultaneously equal to zero for each variable were: Constant term (8.4446, 22 degrees 
of freedom), estimated cost share (17.5134, 22 degrees of freedom), primary purpose 
erosion control (8.0092, 21 degrees of freedom), primary purpose wood production 
(2.6868, 15 degrees of freedom), primary purpose other assistance (0.4578, 9 degrees of 
freedom), cropland (15.1384, 21 degrees of freedom), land capability class I or II 
(16.5857, 22 degrees of freedom), land capability class III or IV (9.3826, 20 degrees of 
freedom), site potential index (6.5925, 14 degrees of freedom), total soil saved (27.5635, 
19 degrees of freedom), total acreage with erosion control (23.9388, 19 degrees of 
freedom), soil loss tolerance 2 tons per acre per year (6.3779, 8 degrees of freedom), soil 
loss tolerance 3 tons per acre per year (9.7466, 17 degrees of freedom), soil loss tolerance 
4 tons per acre per year (9.6947, 19 degrees of freedom), soil loss tolerance 5 tons per 
acre per year (8.2880, 14 degrees of freedom), project involves sediment (2.3094, 15 
degrees of freedom), project involves animal waste (3.0649, 21 degrees of freedom), 
project involves inorganic nutrients (1.7764, 11 degrees of freedom), project involves 
pesticides or toxics (1.7386, 6 degrees of freedom), type of water body affected: rivers 
(3.2766, 15 degrees of freedom), type of water body affected: lakes (1.9887, 6 degrees of   26 
freedom), type of water body affected: wetlands (1.9851, 9 degrees of freedom), type of 
water body affected: groundwater (1.7814, 5 degrees of freedom), designated use 
impaired (0.0477, 2 degrees of freedom), designated use threatened (2.1976, 12 degrees 
of freedom), designated use not determined (1.0761, 8 degrees of freedom).   27 
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Table 1. Applications for Cost Sharing in Maryland by Conservation Program, 
Fiscal Years 1994-1996. 





Prevent soil loss 
and water 
pollution 
FSA  Up to 75% of the cost of 
installation, with a 
maximum of $3,500 per 























FSA  Up to 64% of the first 
$62.5k, 40% of the 
second $62.5k, and 20% 
of the eligible costs above 
$125k; payment limit of 





Plant trees and 
improve timber 
stands 
NRCS  Up to 65% of the cost of 
the activity, not to exceed 
$10k per person per year. 
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in rural areas 
NRCS  Up to 75% of the total 
cost of the activity, and 
up to $50k per person for 







forest land to 
increase timber 
supply and 





Up to 75% of the cost of 
installation, with a 
maximum of $10k per 




N/A  N/A  N/A  10 
Total        4902 
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, CRES data.   29 
 
Table 2. Applications for Cost Share Assistance Under ACP by Primary Purpose 
and Practice. 
Conservation Practices  Code  Primary Purpose  Share (%) 
Integrated crop management  SP53  WQ  26.7 
Sod waterways  WP3  EC/WQ  14.4 
Permanent vegetative cover establishment  SL1  EC/WQ  13.9 
Grazing Land Protection  SL6  EC/WQ  7.8 
Forest Tree Plantations  FR1  EC/WP  6.7 
Agricultural Waste Control Facilities  WP4  WQ  5.7 
Erosion or water control structures  WP1  EC/WQ  4.4 
Forest Tree Stand Improvements  FR2  EC/WP  3.9 
Permanent vegetative cover in critical areas  SL11  EC/WQ  2.9 
Stream Protection  WP2  EC/WQ  2.7 
Permanent vegetative cover improvement  SL2  EC/WQ  2.1 
Others      8.8 
Total       100.0 
Note: WQ - water quality; EC - erosion control; WP - wood production. 
Source: CRES data.   30 
Table 3. Approval Rates for Cost Sharing by County 
County  Not Approved  Approved  Total  Approval Rate (%) 
Allegany   78  72  150  48 
Anne Arundel   9  20  29  69 
Baltimore  20  51  71  72 
Calvert   4  13  17  76 
Caroline   12  23  35  66 
Carroll   64  126  190  66 
Cecil   65  218  283  77 
Charles   4  22  26  85 
Dorchester   7  59  66  89 
Frederick  101  188  289  65 
Garrett   25  40  65  62 
Harford   19  36  55  65 
Howard   16  46  62  74 
Kent   17  73  90  81 
Montgomery   16  32  48  67 
Prince Georges  1  8  9  89 
Queen Anne’s   14  69  83  83 
Somerset   48  64  112  57 
St Mary’s   3  32  35  91 
Talbot   10  42  52  81 
Washington   36  65  101  64 
Wicomico   92  191  283  67 
Worcester   23  97  120  81 
Total  684  1587  2271  70 
Source: CRES data.   31 
Table 4. Summary of Hypotheses Regarding Interpretation of Coefficients 
Variable  Sign of Coefficient if County Committee 
Values: 













Primary purpose erosion control  +  +  ?  ? 
Primary purpose wood production  +  ?  ?  ? 
Primary purpose other assistance  +  0  0  0 
Cropland  +  ?  ?  ? 
Land capability class I or II  +  ?  ?  ? 
Land capability class III or IV  +  ?  ?  ? 
Variables Recorded for Projects with Forestry as a Primary or Secondary Purpose
a 
Site index  +  ?  ?  ? 
Variables Recorded for Projects with Soil Erosion as a Primary or Secondary Purpose
b 
Total soil saved (tons)  +  +  ?  ? 
Total acreage with erosion control (1000 
acres) 
+  +  ?  ? 
Soil loss tolerance 2 tons per acre per 
year 
?  -  -  - 
Soil loss tolerance 3 tons per acre per 
year 
?  -  -  - 
Soil loss tolerance 4 tons per acre per 
year 
+  -  -  - 
Soil loss tolerance 5 tons per acre per 
year 
+  -  -  - 
Variables Recorded for Projects with Water Quality as a Primary or Secondary Purpose
c 
Project involves sediment  0  +  +  ? 
Project involves animal waste  0  0  +  + 
Project involves inorganic nutrients  0  0  +  + 
Project involves pesticides or toxics  0  0  +  ? 
Type of water body affected: rivers  0  0  +  ? 
Type of water body affected: lakes  0  0  +  - 
Type of water body affected: wetlands  0  0  +  ? 
Type of water body affected: 
groundwater 
0  0  +  - 
Designated use impaired  0  0  ?  + 
Designated use threatened  0  0  ?  + 
Designated use not determined  0  0  +  0 
a Variable is equivalent to an interaction term between the indicated variable and a 
dummy equaling one if forestry is the primary or secondary purpose and zero otherwise.  
b Variable is equivalent to an interaction term between the indicated variable and a 
dummy equaling one if soil erosion is the primary or secondary purpose and zero 
otherwise.   32 
c Variable is equivalent to an interaction term between the indicated variable and a 
dummy equaling one if water quality is the primary or secondary purpose and zero 
otherwise.   33 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Probit Model. 
  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Number of Observations  2271   
Approved Projects  1587   
Approval Rate (%)  70   
Estimated cost share ($1000)  1.52  1.37 
Primary purpose erosion control  0.39  0.49 
Primary purpose water quality  0.47  0.50 
Primary purpose wood production  0.10  0.31 
Primary purpose other assistance  0.04  0.19 
Cropland  0.36  0.48 
Land capability class I or II  0.26  0.44 
Land capability class III or IV  0.34  0.47 
Land capability class V or higher  0.06  0.23 
Variables Recorded for Projects with Forestry as a Primary or Secondary 
Purpose
a 
Site index  7.7926  24.07 
Variables Recorded for Projects with Soil Erosion as a Primary or Secondary 
Purpose
b 
Total soil saved (tons)  14.98  52.04 
Total acreage with erosion control (1000 acres)  0.04  0.13 
Soil loss tolerance 1 ton per acre per year  0.04  0.19 
Soil loss tolerance 2 tons per acre per year  0.05  0.21 
Soil loss tolerance 3 tons per acre per year  0.27  0.44 
Soil loss tolerance 4 tons per acre per year  0.18  0.39 
Soil loss tolerance 5 tons per acre per year  0.12  0.32 
Variables Recorded for Projects with Water Quality as a Primary or Secondary 
Purpose
c 
Project involves sediment  0.13  0.33 
Project involves animal waste  0.22  0.41 
Project involves inorganic nutrients  0.13  0.34 
Project involves pesticides or toxics  0.04  0.20 
Project involves other problems  0.01  0.11 
Type of water body affected: rivers  0.39  0.49 
Type of water body affected: lakes  0.01  0.10 
Type of water body affected: wetlands  0.03  0.17 
Type of water body affected: estuary  0.06  0.24 
Type of water body affected: groundwater  0.04  0.19 
Designated use impaired  0.01  0.10 
Designated use threatened  0.19  0.39 
Designated use not determined  0.33  0.47 
Designated use met  0.004  0.06 
a Variable is equivalent to an interaction term between the indicated variable and a 
dummy equaling one if forestry is the primary or secondary purpose and zero otherwise.    34 
b Variable is equivalent to an interaction term between the indicated variable and a 
dummy equaling one if soil erosion is the primary or secondary purpose and zero 
otherwise. 
c Variable is equivalent to an interaction term between the indicated variable and a 
dummy equaling one if water quality is the primary or secondary purpose and zero 
otherwise.   35 
 Table 6. Coefficients of the Cost Share Funding Approval Model 
  Coefficient  Standard Error 
Constant term  -1.11**  0.13 
Estimated cost share ($1000)  -0.08**  0.03 
Primary purpose erosion control  0.58**  0.13 
Primary purpose wood production  0.18  0.33 
Primary purpose other assistance  0.69**  0.19 
Cropland  0.45**  0.10 
Land capability class I or II  0.33**  0.13 
Land capability class III or IV  0.40**  0.12 
Variables Recorded for Projects with Forestry as a Primary or Secondary 
Purpose
a 
Site index  0.02**  0.004 
Variables Recorded for Projects with Soil Erosion as a Primary or Secondary 
Purpose
b 
Total soil saved (tons)  0.003**  0.001 
Total acreage with erosion control (1000 acres)  0.26  0.24 
Soil loss tolerance 2 tons per acre per year  0.12  0.18 
Soil loss tolerance 3 tons per acre per year  0.08  0.13 
Soil loss tolerance 4 tons per acre per year  0.24  0.15 
Soil loss tolerance 5 tons per acre per year  0.36*  0.15 
Variables Recorded for Projects with Water Quality as a Primary or Secondary 
Purpose
c 
Project involves sediment  -0.41  0.26 
Project involves animal waste  0.99**  0.25 
Project involves inorganic nutrients  0.81**  0.26 
Project involves pesticides or toxics  1.60**  0.31 
Type of water body affected: rivers  0.02  0.15 
Type of water body affected: lakes  5.70  759.1 
Type of water body affected: wetlands  0.85**  0.30 
Type of water body affected: groundwater  -0.17  0.22 
Designated use impaired  0.77*  0.40 
Designated use threatened  0.61*  0.26 
Designated use not determined  1.04**  0.27 
c
2 statistic for all variables except constant = 0, 400 
degrees of freedom 
1458.548   
McFadden R
2  0.20   
** Significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
* Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
a Variable is equivalent to an interaction term between the indicated variable and a 
dummy equaling one if forestry is the primary or secondary purpose and zero otherwise.  
b Variable is equivalent to an interaction term between the indicated variable and a 
dummy equaling one if soil erosion is the primary or secondary purpose and zero 
otherwise.   36 
c Variable is equivalent to an interaction term between the indicated variable and a 
dummy equaling one if water quality is the primary or secondary purpose and zero 
otherwise. 